Monday 7 September 2015

Reclaiming Catholic Social Teaching: post 7



Week 3: chapters 6-8


For new readers:

We are now at the beginning of the third week of this four week course. The first post of the course was here.

If you have been following the posts up till now, well done and I'll say more about this week's work below! For anyone who has just arrived on the blog, welcome! There's absolutely no reason why you shouldn't join in now. In essence, this course is just me blogging through Anthony Esolen's book. The posts therefore can be read at any time as prompts to further thought about this work: there is absolutely no reason why this has to be restricted to the period of the four weeks ended 21 September 2015. However, if you are reading this during the four week period, I have left the final week (beginning on 14 September 2015) relatively free of reading the book (we'll only be looking at one chapter in that week) with a few to encouraging some critical reflection on the book as a whole, As it is a relatively short book, there is plenty of time to get the book, read it, and contribute to the comments box in the remaining period of the course. (A Kindle version of the book is available here.)

My synopsis of the course up till now:

In the first five chapters of the book, Esolen has concentrated (following Leo XIII) on the key structures of human societies rather than the neuralgic issues which are often taken to be the heart of Catholic social teaching. He methodology is to to a) restrict himself to Leo XIII writings; b) to integrate this social teaching with the entirety of Catholic teaching rather than to view the social teaching as something separate from (say) teaching on sexual morality or the nature of God; c) to view the teaching through a sensibility enriched with the classical tradition of Western art, thought and philosophy.

In previous chapters, Esolen has focused on the family and the associations of 'civil society': those associations which exist in the space between the State and the family. He does this to reflect a key feature of Leo's teaching: that human nature's fulfilment in associating with other human beings is not done primarily through the State. Moreover, the State exists to reinforce those naturally existing associations rather than to create them from scratch. (Modern reworkings of family life to include divorce and same sex marriage are clearly in Esolen's (and Leo's) sights here.)

My synopsis of chapter 6: The Church as Society:

Key point:

  • The Church is not so much just one other society that human beings may or may not belong to, but the perfect society which is a model for all others.

Modern understandings of social life tend to privilege the political State as a model. Among early modern thinkers such as Hobbes and Locke, the social contract suggests a democratic basis for authority: atomistic indviduals come together in a social contract to form a society -the State. Instead, taking the Church as the paradigm of Society, the model of good human relationships becomes (eg) one which rests on God-given authority (and not the consent of individuals) and one focused on our relationship with God (rather than, as in Hobbes, our physical safety). Democracy can be a valuable part of human life, but, for Leo and Esolen, 'the Church [is] the standard by which we judge democracy' (p.131) rather than vice versa.


My critical discussion of the chapter:

Esolen's book is undoubtedly counter cultural, at least in the sense that it champions some unfashionable social positions. We've already looked in previous chapters at the value of liberty which Esolen has critiqued in its modern form as mere licence and whim. He is now critiquing the value of democracy which again tends to be one of the assumed pillars of modernity: good government is, at the least, democratic. 

If democracy is one of the principles of a good society, the Catholic Church is going to be found wanting! (And indeed, Esolen makes the point that it is precisely in this area that much modern criticism of the Church is focused.) If on the other hand, there are more important principles of society than democracy (and in fact, if democracy is only justifiable to the extent that it serves those more ultimate principles) then it becomes more plausible to argue that the Church is the standard by which other societies are judged than vice versa.

This is probably going to be one of the key areas for assessing your reaction to Esolen and Leo. If you think that democracy is a simple, obvious good, then you are going to find it hard to accept a view of social teaching which stresses the value of hierarchy and authority over democracy. On the other hand, Esolen is certainly not rejecting democracy as a good in its place. To claim that the Church is a model of human association is not to suggest that its structures are simply reproducible in other areas (such as that of the State or even the family). Whatever we may learn from the Church as a model of how to relate to other human beings cannot simply be reproduced mechanically in our family or political life: Church and State are not identical. 

As usual, Esolen refers constantly to Leo XIII's writings. Perhaps the key one for this chapter is Testem Benevolentiae (on 'Americanism'): here.

Questions: (feel free to respond to these or any others in the comments box!):

  • Should all human societies (family, Church, State, businesses) be democratic? Why?
  • Given scandals such as child abuse, can the Church be considered as a model for human relationships?
  • What is the role of authority in human relationships? Is it 'God given'? (And what might that mean?)
[I'll post tomorrow (8/09/15) on chapter 7!]



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